BOOK REVIEW
Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers,
Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1975: Pp. viii, 150.
This book is a problem to review.' It promises more than it
delivers, but it delivers enough to justify its existence. The authors
are John Thibaut, a social psychologist on the faculty of the University of North Carolina, and Laurens Walker, a professor in the Law
School at that same University. They claim in the first line of the
preface that the work is "fully interdisciplinary." I am not sure I
know what that means, though I remember reading in various places
that it is a virtue. Actually, the book strikes me as being mostly a
social science product. The role of the lawyer qua lawyer in such an
endeavor seems basically preliminary, identifying areas of controversy
which might not be apparent to the social scientist untrained or inexperienced in the law, and injecting the laboratory simulations with
realism. The experiment design, the statistical analysis of the results,
and writing up of the results in a standard and professional way is the
domain of the social scientist. Hence, it is not surprising that most of
the language in a book, which deals basically with nine social science
experiments, appears to be the product of a social scientist. This is
not to denigrate Professor Walker's role in the endeavor. The preliminaries are of vital importance. Further, insofar as Professor
Walker is an interested intelligent human being, I have no doubt he
was capable of playing the functional role of a social scientist to the
benefit of the project in other areas. Finally, I am sure that both
authors did their share of the large amount of donkey work which
must be performed to carry any set of experiments from design to
fruition.
Social scientists obtain the information from which they construct
theories about human beings from many sources. Like the rest of us,
they too are human beings, and they live with human beings. They
have themselves to observe and it is inevitable that they will test any
' This book was suggested as a possible program topic for the 1976 annual meeting of the
Civil Procedure Section of the Association of American Law Schools. I read it first in March of
1976 and wrote substantially all of this review at that time. Another topic was ultimately
selected for the Civil Procedure Section meeting and I put away the review, feeling that time
would soften my criticisms. In July of this year I was preparing footnotes to an article which, for
one reason or another, reminded me of this book and the review. Time, it turned out, did not
change my opinions. I offer the review now as a comment not only on this book, but also on
some of the problems of applying social science methods to legal concepts generally.
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general proposition against themselves to see if it rings true. Of
course, they must be aware that they, as individuals, may be significantly different than the run of human kind. Still, they have lived
every day of their lives with others and have accumulated the wealth
of information which comes from life itself. This they use to judge the
contours of their own representativeness. Furthermore, such information will have bearing on their judgment of the likelihood of any
given theoretical proposition about humans in general. The dependability of such judgments from the clinic of life hinges upon the
richness of the experience of the judge, and the care and sophistication with which that experience is evaluated. To this pool of
human information we must add the hearsay we all daily receive,
evaluate and utilize, ranging from rumors and anecdotes of others, to
all the printed information which comes to us through sources of such
varying dependability as the National Enquirer, and the Encyclopedia
Britannica. These sources bring us the bulk of what we know or think
we know about the human past, be it yesterday or 1000 years ago.
In the sense that we all have access to such information and
utilize it to create some general propositions about humans in which
we invest reality, we are all social scientists, though some of us are
not very good at it. The more careful we have been trained to be,
logically and epistemologically, in handling information generally,
the better we will be. At this clinical level some lay persons may be
much more incisive than some professional social scientists. But we
must realize that, no matter how broad our experience, our personal
data is more or less skewed. We have each grown up in a limited
surrounding and known a limited set of people. Knowledge of this
must make our clinical theories of humanity tentative, though the
broader our human experience and the more qualified the proposition
under consideration the more we may feel justified in having some
confidence of judgment on our clinical experience of life alone. The
social sciences as organized disciplines depart from this armchair level
by attempting to design ways to get information about human beings
which are as free from skew as possible, and about which the potentials of unrepresentativeness are isolated and described to the greatest
extent possible.
This is a formidable task. Human beings as individuals and as
groups are mind-bogglingly complex, and the presence of the observer creates artifact problems on a Heisenberg principle analogy of
monstrous proportions. Still, it is a worthwhile endeavor; the goal is
that we may more objectively understand ourselves and correct for
the skews of our own experience with insights from better sampled
information.
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Basically, there have been two major types of social scientists
worthy of the name in the last fifty years, describers and experimenters. Describers have sought to organize their own observations of
human beings in such a way as to set down as factually as possible
complete descriptions of human behavior which they have observed.
Field anthropologists and sociologists are good examples. They may
rely on teams of observers, but then care is taken to standardize the
things to be seen. They may have to rely on the subjects of observation for information on facts or attitudes, but then care is taken to get
information from multiple sources and to design the questions to
check for internal consistency. Their goal, however, is the description
of the human condition as they found it.
The experimenters take human subjects and manipulate them in
a controlled way to observe their responses. The experimenters' goal
is the identification of common mind patterns that will produce predictable and reproducible results.
To a certain extent, the experimental area is where the intellectual action is today. The pioneering days of gross observation are
over, and the embracing of the experimental method puts the social
scientist's procedures more recognizably in congruence with those of
the natural scientists, a position social scientists have coveted for its
perhaps misplaced aura of the high priesthood of immutable truth.
There are, however, costs in becoming an experimenter. If the epis-"
temological problems of the social sciences in general are formidable,
those of the experimenters are overwhelming. In any human experiment, the complexity of the subject makes isolating variables difficult.
Moral and legal restrictions on experimental method make it worse.
Basically, all experimental subjects must be volunteers, a factor which
becomes impossible to factor out. The largest and most convenient
group who will volunteer in significant numbers (for cheap enough
compensation) are students, another variable. The design of an experiment with proper controls isolating variables to any acceptable
degree often produces an experiment which can only test the most
miniscule factor of all the variety of factors which affect human behavior, and deciding what weight it should be taken as having in real
world situations among untested variables is impossible to do with
any precision. No wonder the results of such experiments are so often
tagged with the weak adjective "suggestive." That is the best in most
circumstances they can be.
Actually, that should be enough. Driving one empirical nail into
the lower siding of the edifice of social science knowledge is an honorable task, even if it leaves other corners of the board flapping. The
whole edifice, like the edifice of the natural sciences, will take cen-
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turies to near completion, and necessary moral restrictions on human
experimentation may mandate that some parts of the facade be left
unbuilt. The problem is that everyone wants to believe that what
they have just discovered is not a missing nail, but the missing link.
People's mental well-being, professional reputation and continued
employment often depend on convincing themselves and the world
that their nail is at least a golden spike. This tendency is compounded
by the existence of occasional sets of experimental data which do have
major implications, and do seem to strongly support whole important
theories.
Many people have the good sense to see fruitful areas of inquiry,
only to find that the question they have asked is a composite of many
questions, each being a momentous research task and no one appearing to be of overwhelming general significance. The options then
are to pick one question and concentrate on it, to try and answer the
whole jumble properly, delaying final synthesis for thirty or so years,
or to construct experiments which nibble first at one question, then
another, filling in the gaps with speculation. It seems to me that the
latter is what the book under review reflects. This approach, however, is a difficult horse to ride. The intermingling of speculation
seemingly extrapolated from thin experiments may make the whole
endeavor seem like an attempt to palm off the speculation as the
product of a more rigorous empiric than the clinical experience of life
which is the basis of all social speculation.
There is thus a great temptation to write one's experimental report in cosmic terms, indicating that the experiments were prompted
by overwhelmingly important questions of social policy. If one can
use a lot of normatively loaded words, thus implying the possibility of
an empirical demonstration of the good, so much the better.
The book under review concerns nine experiments which are
generally fine, as far as they go. If one were to be grudging, one
could say that they suggest that students who will volunteer to participate in social science experiments at a state university in the
southern United States for money will at least say that they prefer
dispute resolution procedures where control of those procedures is
assigned to a very great extent to adversaries in front of a judge figure. 2 If one is less grudging, one could say that the results indicate
that Americans like the adversary system. One is inclined to be less
grudging because the suggestions emanating from the results merely
2 The authors acknowledge the weaknesses inherent in their methodology. J. THIBAUT &
L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 4-5 (1975). Unfortunately,
this ackowledgement did not make them cautious in framing their conclusions.
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tend to confirm what the clinical judgment of most lawyers would
have been without them. This is in no way, I repeat, no way to denigrate the value of the experiments. To provide experimental support for armchair wisdom (which is occasionally shown thereby to be
wrong) is a praiseworthy enterprise. These experiments provide com3
petently fashioned, suggestive, nails.
Yet, it is both an overstatement and a misstatement to imply in
the title that these experiments provide even suggestions about the
whole topic of procedural justice, a conceit carried forward in egregious fashion in the preface and at various points throughout the
book. Consider the following exerpt:
It seems clear that the quality of future human life is likely to be
importantly determined by the effectiveness with which disputes
can be managed, moderated, or resolved. Procedures or methods
that may be put to this task of conflict resolution therefore claim
our attention.
We otre not concerned with all such possible methods. Aggression, revolution, warfare, and other violent methods of conflict resolution are not discussed in these pages. The procedures we have
chosen to study are peaceful-at least in their most characteristic
forms.
.. . Among these institutional modes of conflict resolution the
legal process is a salient choice for attention because the courts and
similar agencies constitute the principal formal device for the
large-scale solution of social disputes. It follows that the procedures
of the courts have much potential for creating widespread justice or
injustice. However, what procedures are just?
We suggest that the just procedure for resolving the types of
conflict that result in litigation is a procedure that entrusts much
control over the process to the disputants themselves and relatively
little control to the decision maker. There are many correlated and
subsidiary elements of procedural justice, but the key requirement
for procedural justice is this optimal distribution of control. Our
proposal that in formal litigation control over dispute resolution
ought to be largely in the hands of the disputants is likely to provoke considerable skepticism. We recognize that the allocation of
so much power to self-interested litigants runs contrary to much
current thinking, especially among scholars concerned with legal
process. Nevertheless, this is the ultimate conclusion we draw from
the research reported in this book. We announce this at the outset
to encourage the reader to test this statement against the developing evidence.
3

But see Damaska, Presentationof Evidence, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083 (1975).
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More generally, we propose that distribution of control constitutes the basic variable or dimension for analyzing, comparing, and
assessing the justice of all forms of dispute resolution, legal and
nonlegal.
It is indeed surprising that to date procedural justice has not
been the subject of much, if any, social science research.
• . . There have been some noteworthy empirical studies
about procedure carried out by legal scholars, as, for example, the
jury research of Kalven and Zeisel (1966) and the examination of
the pretrial conference done by Rosenberg (1964a), but these and
similar investigations have only examined the functioning of particular parts of systems. They do not propose any general criteria
for assessment and comparison of procedural systems and, of
course, do not propose any general conclusions about systems.
Procedural justice has therefore been overlooked by social scientists, perhaps because they have been unaware of its importance,
and legal scholars have managed only ad hoc investigations,
perhaps because they have lacked the integrative and analytic concepts. 4
0
The authors have decided that how control of conflict resolution
procedures is distributed among contending parties as individuals,
and between them as a group and any neutral party which might be
involved, is an important thing to examine. No quibble there. That
distribution might affect the accuracy of the process in fact reconstruction, if that is one of the functions of the process under consideration. It might affect the perceptions of the parties concerning the
fairness of the procedure, and this might be useful to know from a
purely utilitarian perspective if one is interested in getting parties to
resort to a process and to accept its results freely. But the authors
have gone further and equated the question of distribution of control
with "procedural justice." This reveals a willingness to tie value
loaded words to the empirical process in an inappropriate way, and a
willingness to make too much of the thin reed of their experimental
results. The general proposition the authors offer as both their
hypothesis and their conclusion will not stand scrutiny.
What people prefer, or say they regard as fair, may have something to do with procedural justice, but the connection is neither obvious nor within the scope of empirical demonstration. I personally
think the basic rationality of any fact reconstruction process is more
central, and readers may supply other factors of their own. But it is
important to realize that the social sciences may, at the outside, tell
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THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 2, at 1-3.
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us what is, and perhaps what may be, but they cannot as sciences tell
us what ought to be. That does not mean that people who also happen to be social scientists may not put forth valuable insights about
justice, but merely that when they provide the normative component
of those insights they act in the capacity of philosophers, not scientists, and must be careful to expose rather than to obscure the dual
role they are playing. So far this review sounds largely negative, not
out of any hostility to the application of social science methods to
legal questions to which they are appropriate, but as a caveat. Practitioners of the social science approach face a community of tough
critics in the legal world. Many lawyers and legal academics have
training in the social sciences. Further, and perhaps more importantly, they are, on the whole, a community of skeptics trained to
ferret out overstatement. Finally, they are a community of fairly
broad experience in the clinic of life in general and life in the law in
particular. They will seize on puffery with a vengeance. My impression of the reputation of the social sciences in these circles is that
they are rather generally suspected of habitual puffery. It is not that
their observations and experiments are thought inaccurate a priori, or
that their speculations either as to nature of reality or proper values
are necessarily more suspect in and of themselves than those of other
mortals. It is that they are suspected of a convenient and easy overblowing of their hard data to support their pet speculations, with a
convenient myopia to the distinction between propositions of fact and
propositions of value in the bargain. Only the utmost scrupulousness
in these regards will gain the efforts of the social sciences in this area
the respect to which they are properly due.
D. Michael Risinger*
B.A., Yale; J.D., Harvard Law School; Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law
School.

